

User security

CIS 2235 Adv Linux System Administration

Overview

There are two main types of security issues:

Attacks & impersonations

Attacks:

Abuse valid services: ping, HTTP, deny-of-service

Impersonation:

take over a **valid** account and have the entire OS to '*play*' in

How?

Use vulnerability in the system.

Trick a user (social engineering) to give up their password

Steal/crack a user's password

User accounts

User account information is in `/etc/passwd`

One line per user account

Standard format – colon delimited

```
userid:x:UID:GID:user information(5):home-dir:login-shell
```

```
almardes:x:1002:1002:Almardef Saoud S.:/home/almardes:/bin/bash
badenc:x:1003:1002:Baden Christopher P.:/home/badenc:/bin/bash
belvalr:x:1004:1002:Belval, Randi S.:/home/belvalr:/bin/bash
bernardk:x:1005:1002:Bernard, Kenneth A.:/home/bernardk:/bin/bash
brownnn:x:1006:1002:Brown, Nathan S.:/home/brownnn:/bin/bash
dulalh:x:1007:1002:Dulal, Hem L.:/home/dulalh:/bin/bash
fortinh:x:1008:1002:Fortin, Harliss R.:/home/fortinh:/bin/bash
haynesp:x:1009:1002:Haynes, Patrick M.:/home/haynesp:/bin/bash
main:x:1010:1002:Mai, Nancy K.:/home/main:/bin/bash
pelchatt:x:1011:1002:Pelchat, Thomas J.:/home/pelchatt:/bin/bash
pokhrelD:x:1012:1002:Pokhrel, Deo D.:/home/pokhrelD:/bin/bash
weeningt:x:1013:1002:Weening, Thomas M.:/home/weeningt:/bin/bash
```

The 7 cols of /etc/passwd

```
kayb:x:1014:1001:Bob Kay,,,:/home/kayb:/bin/bash
keckj:x:1015:1001:Jane Keck,,,:/home/keckj:/bin/bash
```

Username

<= 8 characters, usually

Encrypted pw

'x' means a shadow password file is being used

UID

Unique number, which is really what the OS uses to differentiate users

Ubuntu starts at 1000

GID

Primary group

Usually, the same name as user – /etc/groups

User information

Five columns of information, which vary significantly between Unixes

“not important” – used for finger, etc. Called GECOS

Home-dir

Usually /home/<userid>

Login shell

Default = /bin/bash for Ubuntu

password encryption

- Once upon a time, passwords were encrypted using a DES-based hashing algorithm (crypt) and stored in a field in /etc/passwd.
- Now Linux commonly uses SHA-512-based hashes stored in /etc/shadow. Recent systems (Ubuntu) use yescrypt which resists GPU and ASIC attacks.
- User-supplied password is combined with a random salt and then hashed with SHA-512 (or yescrypt or something else) and stored in the /etc/shadow file
- Users must follow complexity rules

System	Default requirements	Where set
Red Hat CentOS	8+ characters, complexity enforced	/etc/login.defs /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/pam.d/system-auth
Debian Ubuntu	6+ characters, complexity enforced	/etc/login.defs /etc/pam.d/common-password
FreeBSD	No constraints	/etc/login.conf

/etc/shadow

/etc/passwd has to be world-readable to get username, uid, and gid information

So everyone could read the hashed password.

It is now very easy to crack a weakly hashed password.

So, the shadow file is a *separate file* which stores the hashed password

/etc/shadow is not world-readable

```
ldamon@cis2230a:~$ ll -l /etc/passwd /etc/shadow
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3515 2011-11-02 08:31 /etc/passwd
-rw-r----- 1 root shadow 4388 2011-11-03 11:46 /etc/shadow
```

Format of /etc/shadow

```
username:encoded_password:changed:minlife:maxlife:warn:inactive:expires:unused
```

```
root*:17737:0:99999:7:::
```

```
daemon*:17737:0:99999:7:::
```

```
bin*:17737:0:99999:7:::
```

```
sys*:17737:0:99999:7:::
```

```
...
```

```
sshd*:17737:0:99999:7:::
```

```
ldamon:$6$0zaGQLvLzstVENrk$wpEtnBQ1duy4q1G06T5mftE8/
```

```
PmVI9S2HfK84Py.BB7.3z4/
```

```
QVjN00fnrrHcfY.B3iBYlUz5oHSSrSwW9zWUv.:17914:0:99999:7:::
```

```
ftp*:17975:0:99999:7:::
```

```
statd*:17975:0:99999:7:::
```

Account password settings

View “status” (-S):

```
$ sudo passwd -S <username>
```

```
$ passwd -S ldamon
```

```
ldamon P 02/02/2021 0 99999 7 -1
```

Output:

```
name P,L,NP change-date min max warning inactivity
```

P means the account has valid password

NP means the account doesn't have valid password

L means locked

Account password settings

To lock: `$ sudo passwd -l <username>`

To unlock: `$ sudo passwd -u <username>`

Hint: view /etc/shadow after locking and unlocking

To expire an account and *force new pw*:

`$ sudo passwd -e <username>`

Administering passwords

Passwords should be both

1. Easy to remember
2. Hard to guess

Random passwords are great for 2), but not for 1).

If they are hard to remember, users write them down (next to the monitor), defeating the purpose.

Almost any PC can now do “dictionary attacks.”

Compare words in the dictionary to the encrypted password on the system
“jtr” & “crack” are password-cracking programs that are easy to set up.

PASSWORD STRENGTH


|<

< PREV

RANDOM

NEXT >

>|



~28 BITS OF ENTROPY

□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□ □
□□□ □□□
□□□□ □


$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE
WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN
HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE
AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)


DIFFICULTY TO GUESS:
EASY

WAS IT TROMBONE? NO,
TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF
THE 0s WAS A ZERO?

AND THERE WAS
SOME SYMBOL...



DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER:
HARD



~44 BITS OF ENTROPY


□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□

$2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS:
HARD

THAT'S A
BATTERY
STAPLE.

CORRECT!



DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER:
YOU'VE ALREADY
MEMORIZED IT

Spring 202

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED
EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS
TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

||

Breaking a password

The algorithm used to encode the password field is a one-way hash function (such as SHA-512)

A password is concatenated with a randomly generated value called the salt.

The salt is stored in the shadow file as part of the password string:

```
$6$GmWA/qEI$1aTZxcKrAgBCJX2...
```

\$6\$ indicates the hash that is used (SHA-512)

GMWA/qEI is the salt, and the remainder is the hashed password

During login:

The salt is retrieved from the stored password.

The supplied password is hashed with the salt value and

The resultant value is compared with the stored hash.

It is very computationally difficult to recover the original password.

salt

More details on /etc/shadow enc_passwd columns

user:\$type\$salt\$hash:options

Note: '\$' sub-cols

```
root@ubuntu: ~
steve@ubuntu:~$ sudo su -
[sudo] password for steve:
root@ubuntu:~# passwd user06
Enter new UNIX password:
Retype new UNIX password:
passwd: password updated successfully
root@ubuntu:~# passwd user07
Enter new UNIX password:
Retype new UNIX password:
passwd: password updated successfully
root@ubuntu:~# cat /etc/shadow | grep user0[67]
user06:$6$JRtNvp1y$slTs.T4xRW0vntYfK8QDjzdW7fJpsvKjhoC1DFYhdLb8N1YphhYHtYmI5pyY7
wwWyBwLUcVxfHnIoyDed/xuT.:16925:0:99999:7:::
user07:$6$5tv2pvDH$5tNgL.3ORdxp4hYh.VL0UC8opZncYWj9Dxeh9BsTO2769Dgh0TVsiazUJg2no
0YxwaMjMABpK4P60DwVqd7cp.:16925:0:99999:7:::
root@ubuntu:~#
```

2 users with exact same pw

But different salts and therefore different hash

Group definitions

Why groups?

List groups with `$ groups` command

A group is defined in one of 2 ways:

1. A new number in the 4th col of `/etc/passwd`
2. Or an entry in `/etc/group`

`name:x:GID:additional_users`

The 2nd col used to be encrypted group password. There is also an `/etc/gshadow` password file.

The 4th col is a comma-separated list of users in addition to what's defined in `/etc/passwd`

Group definitions

```
ldamon@cis2230a:~$ cat /etc/group  
libvirtd:x:125:ldamon,susie  
kvm:x:126:ldamon,susie
```

Group Passwords

Linux only

Group password:

If there is a valid group password, then other users (non-group members) can access the group with that group password.

If the password is “*” or “!”, then the group is locked, and only members have access to the group

Group shadow file /etc/gshadow format:

```
group_name:encoded_passwd:group_admins:additional_users
```

```
$ ls -l /etc/group /etc/gshadow
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1056 Nov 23 21:58 /etc/group
-rw-r----- 1 root shadow 870 Nov 23 21:58 /etc/gshadow
```

Breaking a password

However, it is still *relatively simple* nowadays to encrypt a dictionary of words using all possible 4096 salt values.

Then, compare the encoded passwords in your /etc/shadow file with their database.

This is a **dictionary attack**, one of the most common methods for gaining or expanding unauthorized access to a system.

A dictionary of 400,000 common words, names, passwords, and simple variations, with hash values using all possible salts, would be a small database by today's standards. *These can be checked in hours, not days.*

How to protect your system

Don't allow too many tries

Don't allow easily guessed passwords

- Too short

- Dictionary word

- A word similar to the user's information

- A proper noun that is well-known (“Vader”).

You, as the system admin, might try to crack your users' passwords using white-hat techniques, but only with permission!

What if it is guessed? (maybe from some other account)

- Force users to change passwords (password expiration??)

- Don't allow past passwords

Password Aging

Per account aging values stored in /etc/shadow
Typical format:

```
username:enc_pw:changed:minlife:maxlife:warn:inactive:expires:unused
```

Password aging settings

changed - date of last change (# days since 1/1/70)

minlife - # days the user has to keep a password; 0 for changing it whenever

maxlife - # days until the user has to change the password

warn - give warning within this many days of maxlife.

inactive - number of days after password expiration when the account will automatically be disabled

expires - the account automatically expires on this date


Password aging in Linux

Command to change these options in Linux: `chage`
e.g. set the max days before user HAS to define a new password (-M):

```
ldamon@cis2230a:/etc$ sudo grep susie shadow
susie:$6$mPJY...:15264:0:99999:7:::
```


```
ldamon@cis2230a:/etc$ sudo chage -M 90 susie
```

```
ldamon@cis2230a:/etc$ sudo grep susie shadow
susie:$6$mPJY...:15264:0:90:7:::
```





List password age settings

```
root@ubuntu:~# chage -l user06
Last password change                : May 04, 2016
Password expires                    : never
Password inactive                   : never
Account expires                    : never
Minimum number of days between password change : 0
Maximum number of days between password change : 99999
Number of days of warning before password expires : 7
root@ubuntu:~#
```



```
root@ubuntu:~# chage -M 30 user06
root@ubuntu:~# chage -l user06
Last password change                : May 04, 2016
Password expires                    : Jun 03, 2016
Password inactive                   : never
Account expires                    : never
Minimum number of days between password change : 0
Maximum number of days between password change : 30
Number of days of warning before password expires : 7
root@ubuntu:~#
```



Replace `passwd` command

You can replace default `passwd` with freely available '`npasswd`'
`npasswd` checks for password triviality before changing it
in `/etc/shadow`.

For Linux, this is rarely done because of the PAM system.

password complexity

- We previously mentioned complexity rules per system

System	Default requirements	Where set
Red Hat CentOS	8+ characters, complexity enforced	/etc/login.defs /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/pam.d/system-auth
Debian Ubuntu	6+ characters, complexity enforced	/etc/login.defs /etc/pam.d/common-password
FreeBSD	No constraints	/etc/login.conf

/etc/login.defs

Some options in `/etc/login.defs` for protection:

PASS_MIN_DAYS

PASS_MAX_DAYS

OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENABLE *(see next page)*

PASS_CHANGE_TRIES

PASS_MIN_LEN

Default OBSCURE check

Enable some “very minimal” extra checks on password strength.

Palindrome

Verifies that the new password is not a palindrome of (i.e., the reverse of) the previous one.

Hithere → erehtiH

Case Change Only

Verifies that the new password isn't the same as the old one with a change of case.

Waycool → WAYCOOL

Similar

Verifies that the new password isn't too much like the previous one.

blahblah → blahblah9

Simple

Is the new password too simple? This is based on the length of the password and the number of different types of characters (alpha, numeric, etc.) used.

abc123

Rotated

Is the new password a rotated version of the old password?

billy → illyb

Additional PAM modules for Linux

- There are lots of available PAM mods
- Each one can be added to the 'stack'
- The list is pretty dynamic. Even this list is out-of-date.

6. A reference guide for available modules	11
6.1. pam_access - logdaemon style login access control	11
6.2. pam_cracklib - checks the password against dictionary words	14
6.3. pam_debug - debug the PAM stack	18
6.4. pam_deny - locking-out PAM module	19
6.5. pam_echo - print text messages	20
6.6. pam_env - set/unset environment variables	21
6.7. pam_exec - call an external command	23
6.8. pam_faildelay - change the delay on failure per-application	24
6.9. pam_filter - filter module	25
6.10. pam_ftp - module for anonymous access	26
6.11. pam_group - module to modify group access	27
6.12. pam_issue - add issue file to user prompt	29
6.13. pam_keyinit - display the keyinit file	30
6.14. pam_lastlog - display date of last login	32
6.15. pam_limits - limit resources	33
6.16. pam_listfile - deny or allow services based on an arbitrary file	36
6.17. pam_localuser - require users to be listed in /etc/passwd	38
6.18. pam_loginuid - record user's login uid to the process attribute	38
6.19. pam_mail - inform about available mail	39
6.20. pam_mkhomedir - create users home directory	41
6.21. pam_motd - display the motd file	42
6.22. pam_namespace - setup a private namespace	42
6.23. pam_nologin - prevent non-root users from login	46
6.24. pam_permit - the promiscuous module	47
6.25. pam_rhosts - grant access using rhosts file	48
6.26. pam_rootok - gain only root access	49
6.27. pam_securetty - limit root login to special devices	50
6.28. pam_selinux - set the default security context	51
6.29. pam_shells - check for valid login shell	52
6.30. pam_succeed_if - test account characteristics	52
6.31. pam_tally - login counter (tallying) module	54
6.32. pam_time - time controled access	57
6.33. pam_umask - set the file mode creation mask	59
6.34. pam_unix - traditional password authentication	60
6.35. pam_userdb - authenticate against a db database	63
6.36. pam_warn - logs all PAM items	64
6.37. pam_wheel - only permit root access to members of group wheel	65
6.38. pam_xauth - forward xauth keys between users	66

Required hardened passwords

PAM mods can be added to increase the default password strength

Red Hat and Fedora systems include the `pam_cracklib` password complexity check in their default configuration.

For Debian and Ubuntu systems, install either `pam_cracklib` (old) or `pam_passwdqc`.

To ensure strong passwords, install `pam_passwdqc`.

“password-quality-control”

e.g. `/etc/pam.d/common-password:`

```
# here are the per-package modules (the "Primary" block)
password      requisite      pam_passwdqc.so
password      [success=1 default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure sha512
```


passwdqc

Install “libpam-passwdqc” from apt-get

It **requires** the user to use three different 'classes' of characters to ensure a dictionary word is not used

- Upper case

- Lower case

- Numbers

- Special characters

It also allows for a “pass-phrase.”

- > three words

- 11 to 40 characters – a variety of characters

- Use sentence/verse/poem

- 1) easy to remember, 2) hard to guess which one

Using libpam-passwdqc in Ubuntu

```
ldamon@vtc_cis2230:~$ sudo passwd fred
```

You can now choose the new password or passphrase.

A valid password should be a mix of upper and lower case letters, digits, and other characters. You can use an 8 character long password with characters from at least 3 of these 4 classes, or a 7 character long password containing characters from all the classes. An upper case letter that begins the password and a digit that ends it do not count towards the number of character classes used.

A passphrase should be of at least 3 words, 11 to 40 characters long, and contain enough different characters.

Alternatively, if no one else can see your terminal now, you can pick this as your password: "story\$all_revolt".

```
Enter new password: 12345678
```

```
Weak password: not enough different characters or classes for this length.
```

```
Try again.
```

Password history (remember=)

You can *require* a user to not-reuse a previous password

Some debate on if this is a good idea or not

Users most-always hate it

Setup in `/etc/pam.d/common-password`:

Add “remember=n” to pam_unix to store pw

Add pam_cracklib or pam_passwdqc to check past pws

```
# here are the per-package modules (the "Primary" block)
password requisite pam_passwdqc.so
password [success=1 default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure use_authok
                                     try_first_pass sha512 remember=5
```

Password history

When user changes their password, the old one is stored in `/etc/security/opasswd`

```
steve@vtc_cis2230:~$ sudo cat /etc/security/opasswd
fred:1002:2:$1$Vd6RCQ74$H5rpby0qKkMnVeQ533dxM.,
          $1$vSYRGbq1$0VnVRhAxpfaYrds7FuWn01
```

user uid # comma-sep-enc-passwd

Then, it cannot be used for n times

```
fred@vtc_cis2230:~$ passwd
Enter new password:
Re-type new password:
Password has been already used. Choose another.
passwd: Authentication token manipulation error
passwd: password unchanged
```

Lock account after too many tries (pam_tally)

By default, a user can try to login as often they want

However, this *could be* an 'attack'

Add pam_tally.so to /etc/pam.d/common-password

```
auth required pam_tally.so onerr=fail deny=5 unlock_time=21600
```

Where:

deny=5 - Deny access if tally for this user exceeds 5 times.

unlock_time=21600 – Account reset/unlocked time. 21600 seconds = 6 hours. Default is the account is locked until the lock is removed by a manual intervention of the system administrator.

onerr=fail - If something weird happens (like unable to open the file), return with PAM_SUCCESS if onerr=succeed is given, else with the corresponding PAM error code.

Lock account after too many tries (pam tally)

Default file `/var/log/faillog` keeps login counts.

Also, you can see how many failures your user has by using

```
pam_tally --user root
```

And you can reset the failures to 0 with

```
pam_tally --user root --reset
```

Example

```
steve@vtc_cis2230:~$ su - fred
Account locked due to 7 failed logins
su: Authentication failure
```

```
steve@vtc_cis2230:~$ pam_tally
User steve (1000) has 1
User fred (1002) has 7
```

```
steve@vtc_cis2230:~$ sudo pam_tally --user=fred --reset=0
User fred(1002) had 7
```

```
steve@vtc_cis2230:~$ su - fred
Password:
fred@vtc_cis2230:~$
```